Bank partnership and liquidity crisis by CHOI, Seungho et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
11-2020 
Bank partnership and liquidity crisis 
Seungho CHOI 
Yong Kyu GAM 
Junho PARK 
Hojong SHIN 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 120 (2020) 105958 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Journal of Banking and Finance 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf 
Bank partnership and liquidity crisis ✩ 
Seungho Choi a , Yong Kyu Gam b , ∗, Junho Park c , Hojong Shin d 
a QUT Business School, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD 40 0 0, Australia 
b Institute of Financial Studies, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, No. 55 Guanghuacun Street, Chengdu, Sichuan 610074, PR China 
c Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 
d College of Business, California State University, Long Beach, United States 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 26 November 2019 
Accepted 19 September 2020 









a b s t r a c t 
This study empirically investigates the relationship between banking integration and liquidity manage- 
ment. To measure banks’ connectivity, we use the number of partnerships proxied via the syndicated 
loan arrangements in which they serve as lead arrangers. If banks establish more business partnerships 
through syndicated loan arrangements, those under market stress are more likely to face increased fund- 
ing costs, create reduced liquidity, and originate declined small business loans and mortgages. Those 
banks with more partners are shown to have a lower liquidity coverage ratio, suggesting that business 
partnerships create a disincentive toward liquidity risk management. 
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Amid the 20 07–20 09 financial crisis (hereafter, the “financial 
crisis”), many banks experienced severe funding issues due to liq- 
uidity evaporation and interbank market freezes, and it is neces- 
sary to understand why. Academicians and policymakers view in- 
terbank connections in integrated financial markets as one of the 
key drivers behind the liquidity constraints seen during the fi- 
nancial crisis. Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, and Lorenzoni (2019) develop 
a theoretical model in which financial integration leads to a re- 
duction of total liquid resources in the banking system, making 
it more vulnerable to systemic shock. Despite the significant im- 
plications of the relationship between interbank connections and 
the liquidity problems of banks, empirical research is limited. In 
this study, we fill the gap by employing interbank business part- 
nerships formed through syndicated loan arrangements as the key 
measure for interbank relationships and empirically investigate 
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how a bank’s growing relationships with its business partners af- 
fect its vulnerability to liquidity shocks under market stress. 
Banks’ reliance on interbank funding could be highly correlated 
with their liquidity risk management. On the one hand, as banks’ 
accessibility to interbank borrowing grows, the banks’ motivation 
to strengthen their liquidity risk management could be weakened. 
On the other hand, if banks face higher liquidity risks, they may 
be more strongly incentivized to engage in interbank borrowing as 
an alternative to their liquidity risk control. In other words, there 
could be simultaneous causality between banks’ reliance on inter- 
bank funding and their liquidity risk management. For this reason, 
we employ a new measure that effectively captures the interbank 
connection but is less influenced by the banks’ liquidity risks—the 
number of a bank’s business partnerships with financial institu- 
tions constructed by its syndicated loan arrangements. We find a 
strong positive correlation between our new measure for interbank 
business partnerships and the interbank market activity variable 
in the existing literature (e.g., Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, Lóránth, and 
Pelizzon, 2014 ). 
Banks’ business partnerships made through syndicated loan ar- 
rangements have grown dramatically since the early 1990s (Berlin, 
Nini, and Yu, forthcoming; Jiang, Li, and Shao, 2010 ). Fig. 1 high- 
lights the rapid growth in the number of business partnerships be- 
tween lead arrangers and their participating financial institutions 
established by syndicated loan arrangements from the mid-1990s 
to the financial crisis. A bank’s growing business partnerships with 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105958 
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Fig. 1. Trend of the number of banks’ business partnerships. 
This figure presents the trends for the number of business partnerships formed by 
the syndicated loan arrangements between a lead arranger bank and participating 
financial institutions. The number of business partnerships is counted as the pairs 
of a lead arranger bank and individual participating financial institution for each 
syndicated loan. Each arranger bank’s number of business partnerships is aggre- 
gated at its BHC level each year. BHCs that have no syndicated loan lead arranger 
bank are not included in this figure. 
other financial institutions may be an important source of its in- 
creasing accessibility to interbank funding. We hypothesize that 
pre-existing syndicated loan business partnerships may mitigate 
the information asymmetries between the lead arranger bank and 
its partnered financial institutions, facilitating funding between the 
lead arranger and participants, given the former’s urgent money 
demand. As noted by Castiglionesi et al. (2019) , financial integra- 
tion among banks encourages banks to reduce their liquidity hold- 
ings and shift their portfolios toward less-liquid investments, in- 
creasing the bank’s vulnerability to liquidity shocks. Against this 
background, we predict that a bank with more business partner- 
ships through its syndicated loan arrangements has less incentive 
to strictly manage its liquidity risk, ultimately making it more vul- 
nerable to liquidity constraints during market stress. 
In this study, we aggregate the number of business partnerships 
between the lead arranger bank and individual participating finan- 
cial institutions formed through the former’s syndicated loan ar- 
rangements. We consider all syndicated loan deals arranged by the 
lead arranger bank from the past five years to the previous year 
and sum the number of business partnerships from those deals. Fi- 
nally, we aggregate the number of syndicated loan partnerships of 
each lead arranger bank at its bank holding company (BHC) level. 
We drop duplicated partnerships that have repeatedly joined mul- 
tiple syndicated loan deals lead-arranged by the BHC during the 
past five years. In our tests, we limit samples to local banks that 
are subsidiaries of U.S. BHCs and examine the relative liquidity 
constraints among local banks placed in the same county. Similarly 
to Cortés (2015) , we define a local bank as one that collects more 
than 65% of its deposits from a single county. 
In the first set of regressions, we examine whether a bank 
with more business partnerships with financial institutions is more 
likely to be financially constrained in a stressed market. The peri- 
ods of market stress are defined as the months within the sam- 
ple period that have monthly average spreads of three-month com- 
mercial paper (CP) market yields against risk-free rates in the top 
20%, similar to the approach of Acharya and Mora (2015) . To mea- 
sure a bank’s financing difficulties during market stress, we em- 
ploy its average monthly deposit interest rate—the rate for a 12- 
month certificate of deposit (CD), similar to Drechsler, Savov, and 
Schnabl (2017) . The results show that, if banks are affiliated with 
BHCs that build more business partnerships with participating in- 
stitutions through syndicated loan arrangements, they pay higher 
deposit interest rates in a stressed market. These results suggest 
that banks with more business partnerships with financial institu- 
tions are exposed to higher liquidity shocks than are those with 
less-extensive partnerships. It is important to note that our results 
are robust to employing time-county and bank-county fixed effects. 
These fixed effects enable us to absorb county-specific characteris- 
tics, such as local credit demand and economic state, as well as 
macroeconomic conditions, which may be related to banks’ fund- 
ing costs in stressed markets, and focus on the interbank variation 
among local banks in the same county at a given time. The regres- 
sions also add a number of BHC- or bank-level control variables, 
including banks’ size, capital structure, asset quality, and loan com- 
position, to control for bank-specific characteristics. Moreover, our 
results are robust to the exclusion of the financial crisis as well as 
the post-crisis period. 
The consequence of the adverse liquidity shocks may not be 
limited to the banks’ external financing but subsequently can be 
spilled over to the banks’ ordinary courses of business, includ- 
ing liquidity creation and lending activities (e.g., Acharya and 
Mora, 2015 ; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011 ; 
Diamond and Rajan, 2001 ; Khwaja and Mian, 2008 ). Accordingly, 
we move on to how the number of a bank’s business partnerships 
relates to bank liquidity creation during market stress. Following 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) , we construct bank liquidity-creation 
measures based on the ease, cost, and time for customers to ob- 
tain liquid funds from the bank as well as the ease, cost, and time 
for banks to dispose of their obligations to meet their liquidity 
demands. For instance, the higher the bank liquidity creation, the 
more liquid the funds in the market from the perspective of cus- 
tomers. We hypothesize that banks with more business partner- 
ships are less likely to create liquidity in the market during periods 
of market stress. 
On average, we find that banks with more relationships with 
business partners tend to downsize their liquidity creation dur- 
ing periods of market stress compared with banks with fewer 
such relationships. This finding rules out the alternative explana- 
tion that banks with more business partnerships face increasing 
funding costs due to the increased demand for liquidity provisions 
in stressed markets. We also find that the results are driven mainly 
by off-balance-sheet liquidity creation, suggesting that banks with 
more business partnerships issue liquid guarantees, such as ac- 
quired net participation and liquid derivatives, rather than illiq- 
uid guarantees, such as unused commitments, which are essential 
instruments for banks to create liquidity. The results are consis- 
tent with previous studies that show that off-balance-sheet liquid- 
ity creation comprises a significant proportion of banks’ liquidity 
creation. 
Next, we test how the number of a bank’s business partnerships 
is associated with its origination of small business lending as well 
as mortgage originations in stressed markets. Our regression re- 
sults indicate that banks with extensive business partnerships are 
less likely to originate small business lending in market downturns 
than are banks with fewer such partnerships. For mortgage origi- 
nation, we find that banks with more business partnerships tend 
to reduce the origination of jumbo mortgages as well as that of re- 
tained mortgages compared with non-jumbo or securitized mort- 
gage origination in stressed markets than do banks with fewer 
such partnerships. Jumbo mortgages and retained mortgages are 
considered to be the types of lending severely affected by banks’ 
liquidity issues compared with non-jumbo and securitized mort- 
gages, which are relatively easy to liquidate (e.g., Gilje, Loutskina, 
and Strahan, 2016 ; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009 ). This finding sug- 
gests that banks with more business partnerships are more af- 
fected by aggregate liquidity shocks and, thus, find it more difficult 
to meet loan demands during market stress. 
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Overall, banks partnered with more institutions are more ad- 
versely influenced by market stress in terms of their liabilities, as- 
sets, and off-balance-sheet activities than are banks partnered with 
fewer institutions. We hypothesize that readily available external 
financing incentivizes banks with more business partnerships to 
loosen their liquidity risk controls by reducing reserves of safe 
liquid assets and expanding less-liquid assets ( Castiglionesi et al., 
2019 ). To identify a channel responsible for the higher vulnerabil- 
ity of banks with more partnerships to liquidity shocks, we inves- 
tigate whether the more-partnered banks tend to loosen their liq- 
uidity risks. To measure the liquidity risk management of banks, 
we employ the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). LCR was introduced 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) after the 
financial crisis as the new international standard for a bank’s liq- 
uidity risk measurement and control. LCR measures whether the 
bank holds sufficient amounts of high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) 
to survive stressed market conditions for at least one month. 1 LCR 
admits only HQLAs as the bank’s available liquidity and considers 
both on- and off-balance-sheet items to measure the bank’s ex- 
pected net cash outflows in periods of market stress. Hong, Huang, 
and Wu (2014) find that the LCR measure is improved in terms of 
its adequacy to capture a bank’s liquidity risk as compared to the 
traditional proxies, such as a simple ratio of liquid assets over total 
assets. We relate a bank’s estimated LCR to its number of busi- 
ness partnerships with syndicated loan participants. Because each 
bank’s LCR is not publicly available, we use its financial statement 
to estimate its LCR, similar to Hong et al. Our results suggest that, 
as a bank has more business partnerships with financial institu- 
tions through its syndicated loan arrangements, it tends to main- 
tain a lower LCR, implying that it loosens its liquidity management 
and, thus, becomes more vulnerable to liquidity risks. We also find 
that banks with a lower LCR are more likely to face severe liquidity 
constraints in a stressed market in terms of deposit funding costs. 
From all the above test results, we conclude that a bank with more 
business partnerships tends to relax its liquidity management and 
subsequently faces more-severe liquidity constraints in a stressed 
market, as revealed by its higher deposit funding cost, less liquid- 
ity creation, and less loan origination for small business lending 
and mortgages. 
This study is the first of its kind to provide empirical evi- 
dence on the relationship between the number of banks’ busi- 
ness partnerships and liquidity crises in stressed markets. Banks 
may rely on business partnerships for their liquidity demands 
instead of holding liquid assets of their own. There is a draw- 
back to their reliance on business relationships with other finan- 
cial institutions, however, which is exposed in a stressed market 
(i.e., when banks face higher liquidity shocks). Our empirical re- 
sults are directly related to the theoretical framework suggested 
by Castiglionesi et al. (2019) , who analyze the effects of financial 
integration on the stability of the banking system. They propose 
that financial integration induces banks to reduce their liquidity 
holdings and shift their portfolios toward more-profitable but less- 
liquid investments. Further, they propose that financial integration 
leads to drastic interest rate spikes in times of crisis. Our study 
provides empirical evidence that is consistent with their theoret- 
ical expectations. Our paper also is related to Castiglionesi and 
Navarro (2020) , who study the trade-off of a bank’s increased 
connections in interbank markets (more diversification of liquid- 
ity risks vs. higher exposure to bankruptcy risks). Our study also 
is in line with Chavaz (2017) , who empirically tests the relation- 
ship between banks’ geographic diversification and their liquidity 
buffer. Our study is different from Chavaz, however, in the way that 
1 “Basel III: The liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools” (Jan- 
uary 2013), which is available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf . 
we measure financial integration. Although Chavaz employs geo- 
graphic networks of bank branches, we introduce a novel measure 
of interbank business relationships as a proxy for financial integra- 
tion. 
In addition, our study contributes to empirical research on 
the determinants of bank liquidity creation. The seminal study 
by Berger and Bouwman (2009) provides comprehensive liq- 
uidity creation measures and examines the relationship be- 
tween the equity ratio and bank liquidity creation. Following 
their measures, many studies empirically investigate the deter- 
minants of bank liquidity creation: regulatory interventions and 
capital support ( Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck, 2016 ), 
bank governance ( Díaz and Huang, 2017 ), economic policy un- 
certainty ( Berger, Guedhami, Kim, and Li, 2018 ), CEO optimism 
( Huang, Chen, and Chen, 2018 ), and bank competition ( Choi, 2018 ; 
Jiang, Levine, and Lin, 2019 ). Our study contributes to the literature 
by showing that banks with more business partnerships decrease 
bank liquidity creation during market stress. 
This paper is also a part of the literature that addresses 
how banks’ liquidity shocks affect their lending activities 
( Bernanke and Blinder, 1992 ; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011 ; 
Drechsler et al., 2017 ; Gilje et al., 2016 ; Ivashina and Scharf- 
stein, 2010 ; Kashyap and Stein, 20 0 0 ; Khwaja and Mian, 2008 ; 
Loutskina and Strahan, 2009 ; Peek and Rosengren, 20 0 0 ; 
Schnabl, 2012 ). Many of the papers mentioned above employ 
positive or negative shocks on the banks’ funding or liquidity 
and examine how those shocks affect their lending activities 
afterward. Our paper also relates banks’ liquidity problems to their 
loan origination for small business lending and mortgage during 
periods of market stress. This study contributes to the literature 
by identifying banks’ reliance on interbank business partnerships 
as one of the underlying factors that differentiate banks’ liquidity 
problems and subsequent lending activities in stressed markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the theoretical motivation and hypotheses. In 
Section 3 , we describe the empirical methodology. Section 4 pro- 
vides the data and summary statistics. The results of the empirical 
tests are provided in Section 5 . Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical motivation 
In this section, we describe the theoretical motivation for why 
banks tend to face severe liquidity problems if they have more re- 
lationships with business partners. Traditionally, banks relied on 
“stored liquidity” to manage their liquidity risk by increasing their 
liquid assets and reducing loans and other illiquid assets that ac- 
count for most of their profitability. As an alternative, banks can 
control their liquidity risks by changing their liability structures 
toward long-term financing instead of short-term borrowing. Nev- 
ertheless, such a duration adjustment toward long-term financing 
also increases banks’ overall funding costs and ultimately lowers 
their profitability because the funding costs of long-term debts are 
usually higher than those of short-term ones. This worsened prof- 
itability is a major disadvantage of banks’ strict liquidity risk man- 
agement. 
Banks’ conservative liquidity controls, such as holding more liq- 
uid assets and relying on long-term borrowing, however, can have 
benefits. This strategy enables banks to reduce the likelihood that 
they face severe liquidity shortfalls under bank-specific urgent liq- 
uidity demands. Once banks experience severe liquidity shortfalls, 
they can survive by issuing high-yield debts or conducting a fire 
sale of profitable long-term assets, which would severely lower 
their performance. Thus, strengthened liquidity risk management 
can protect banks’ profitability by reducing their likelihood of suf- 
fering severe liquidity shortfalls. In this sense, liquidity risk man- 
agement creates both benefits and costs for banks. By considering 
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both the advantages and disadvantages, banks find their optimal 
level of liquidity risk management. 
As documented by Castiglionesi et al. (2019) , each bank’s op- 
timal liquidity control should differ, depending on its financing 
environment. Banks may rely on “purchased liquidity” instead of 
stored liquidity under favorable circumstances. If a bank has read- 
ily available external financing through the interbank market, it 
is less likely to face liquidity shortfalls, given a bank-specific liq- 
uidity shock, even without sufficient liquidity. In other words, the 
marginal benefit of the bank’s strict liquidity control is reduced 
with a better funding environment. Accordingly, the favorable fi- 
nancing condition incentivizes the bank to loosen its costly liq- 
uidity risk control because lax liquidity management improves its 
profitability, while the likelihood of the bank’s having a serious 
liquidity shortfall diminishes. By contrast, if an external financing 
condition is less favorable to a bank, its optimal liquidity risk man- 
agement should be more conservative. For this bank, the marginal 
benefit of its stringent liquidity control is still sufficiently high. 
One of the factors that differentiates each bank’s external fi- 
nancing condition, given bank-specific urgent liquidity demands, is 
how actively the bank engages in interbank money market trans- 
actions. An increase in the bank’s accessibility to the interbank 
money market results in an increase in the availability of short- 
term external financing to the bank. The abundant liquidity supply 
will weaken the bank’s motivation to strengthen its liquidity con- 
trol and ultimately increase its liquidity risk. The opposite, how- 
ever, is possible, as well. If a bank’s exposure to liquidity risks is 
growing, the bank might be strongly led to engage in interbank 
borrowing as an alternative to its liquidity risk control. In other 
words, simultaneous causality could exist between a bank’s re- 
liance on interbank funding and its liquidity risk. For this reason, 
we develop a new variable that well captures the interbank con- 
nection but is less influenced by the bank’s current liquidity risk. 
This new measure is how many business partnerships the bank es- 
tablishes with other financial institutions. 
To identify interbank business partnerships, we turn to banks’ 
arrangement of syndicated loans with participating financial in- 
stitutions. We find that this new measure is positively correlated 
with the variable used to identify interbank funding relationships 
in the literature ( Castiglionesi et al., 2014 ). The pre-existing busi- 
ness relationships established through syndicated loans enable the 
participating banks to be well aware of the asset quality of the 
lead arrangers. This will reduce information asymmetries between 
lead arrangers and their partners, which may facilitate lending 
from participating banks to the arranging banks when the lead ar- 
ranger faces an urgent money demand. Moreover, the interbank 
lending market is an over-the-counter market, in which counter- 
parties need to contact and negotiate with each other directly. It is 
not feasible to trade their liquidity if two parties have not known 
each other’s presence and credibility. Thus, banks with such ex- 
tensive partnerships are likely to easily overcome liquidity shocks 
by obtaining liquidity from the interbank market, even when they 
hold insufficient liquid assets. Ultimately, banks’ growing relation- 
ships with business partners may incentivize them to loosen their 
costly liquidity risk management, as lax liquidity management can 
promote banks’ profitability, while having more business partners 
can mitigate concerns about potential liquidity shocks. 
Banks’ lax liquidity risk management strategies in response to 
their extensive business partnerships work well as long as the 
market continues to function as expected. When money market 
transactions are sufficiently active to ensure that banks with ur- 
gent money demands can find counterparties to supply funds on 
time, liquidity-demanding banks encounter no liquidity problems 
and can enjoy higher profits by reducing liquidity holdings while 
expanding credit supply. Money market transactions are no longer 
active, however, if unprecedented adverse market-wide shocks af- 
fect the banking system similarly to those at the outset of the fi- 
nancial crisis. Financial institutions with idle money will not pro- 
vide it to those with short-term liquidity demands due to the 
heightened uncertainty about the solvency of those counterparties. 
In such a frozen market, banks with urgent demands for funding 
face difficulties in obtaining additional liquidity from the money 
market despite having extensive business relationships with other 
financial institutions. 
Banks with emergency funding demands have to survive mar- 
ket stress through their own liquidity, whereas banks with more 
business partnerships do not hold sufficient liquid assets to endure 
money market freezes. Having more relationships with business 
partners induces banks to rely on the liquidity purchased from 
the network comprised of such partnerships instead of storing liq- 
uidity, diminishing the liquid assets available at the outset of the 
crisis. Consequently, banks’ high reliance on business partnerships 
collectively results in liquidity problems for the entire banking sec- 
tor under an adverse market-wide shock. The liquidity problems 
will ultimately result in deteriorated liquidity creation and lending 
activities, particularly in those banks with more business partners. 
These liquidity problems are the unintended consequence of the 
financial integration highlighted by Castiglionesi et al. (2019) . 
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1. Business partnership measurement 
One of the key issues for our empirical tests is how to identify 
the number of a bank’s business partnerships with financial insti- 
tutions. To measure a bank’s business relationships, we select an 
observable partnership: the relationships made through syndicated 
loan arrangements between the lead-arranging bank and partici- 
pating financial institutions. In loan syndication, a lead arranger 
invites financial institutions that provide funds to the syndicated 
loan deal as participants. We assume that, if a lead arranger orig- 
inates a deal and invites participants to the deal, a close business 
partnership is established between the lead arranger and partici- 
pating institutions. We further hypothesize that pre-existing syn- 
dicated loan business partnerships mitigate the information asym- 
metries between the lead arranger and participants, increasing the 
likelihood of the former’s borrowing from its business partners. 
We use the number of relationships between a syndicated loan 
lead arranger and its participating financial institutions as a proxy 
for the number of the lead arranger bank’s business partnerships. 
Specifically, we count and aggregate the number of relationships 
between the lead arranger and participants for all syndicated loan 
deals that originated during the last five years before the previ- 
ous year (the same quarter-end) at the lead arranger bank’s par- 
ent BHC level. We drop duplicated partnerships that have repeat- 
edly joined several syndicated loan deals lead-arranged by the BHC 
during the past five years. 2 Then, the number of aggregated busi- 
ness partnerships is assigned to individual subsidiary banks under 
the same BHC. The natural logarithm of the number of aggregated 
business partnerships is used as a continuous variable that mea- 
sures the number of a bank’s business partnerships with financial 
institutions. 
In constructing our partnership measure, we count only the 
number of partnerships established by a bank as the lead arranger 
of the syndicated loans. If the bank joins a syndicated loan as a 
participant, the bank’s relationship with its lead arranger is not re- 
garded as the partnership in this study. Our measure reflects the 
functional differences between the lead arranger and the partici- 
pants in the process of the syndicated loan origination. The roles 
2 Our results are robust to keeping duplicated partnerships when measuring the 
number of the lead arranger’s business partnerships. 
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of participants in syndicated loans are generally limited to the 
provision of funds. In contrast, the lead arranger assumes more 
extensive and crucial roles in managing the overall processes of 
the syndicated loan origination, including loan screening, covenant 
monitoring, and loan renegotiation afterward (e.g., Ivashina and 
Sun, 2011 ). The broader and deeper roles of a lead arranger im- 
ply that the participants entrust the lead arranger with the man- 
agement of their funds for the syndication. Because information 
asymmetry between the lead arranger and the participant banks 
exists (e.g., Ivashina, 2009 ), the participants need to be aware of 
the arranger’s managing ability, credibility, and financial sound- 
ness to mitigate the information asymmetry. In other words, the 
partnerships formed as lead arrangers are expected to be differ- 
ent from those constructed as participants in terms of their effec- 
tiveness in mitigating information asymmetry; the former is more 
effective than the latter. Hence, our measure counts only the syn- 
dicated loan partnerships established by a bank as a lead arranger 
with its participants. 
3.2. Empirical design 
In this paper, we focus on local banks that are subsidiaries of 
U.S. BHCs. Following Cortés (2015) , a local bank is defined as a 
bank that collects more than 65% of its deposits from a single 
county. We do not include multi-regional banks in our sample be- 
cause the liquidity constraints of those multi-regional banks (i.e., 
nationwide banks) can be contaminated by unobserved economic 
situations of various regions simultaneously. On the contrary, a lo- 
cal bank is assigned to a single county. A local bank’s liquidity po- 
sition will be directly affected by the local economic condition of a 
single region in which the majority of the bank’s deposits are col- 
lected. Even though various types of unobserved local conditions 
still exist in each local market, those factors can be absorbed by 
time-county fixed effects, as each bank is matched to a specific 
county. For this reason, we limit our sample to local banks affili- 
ated in U.S. BHCs. 
In our empirical test, we relate the variables that measure 
banks’ liquidity constraints to the number of their syndicated loan 
business partnerships during market stress. The regression model 
is as follows: 
Deposit Rat e i,m = β0 + β1 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,m 
+ β2 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,m × Stres s m 
+ X i,m + δm,c + δi,c + εi,m (1) 
The subscripts i, m , and c refer to the bank, month, and county, 
respectively. DepositRate, the outcome variable, is a bank’s monthly 
average interest rate for a CD with a maturity of 12 months and 
an account size of 10,0 0 0 USD. Using DepositRate , we measure a 
bank’s funding cost movement or its liquidity constraint in stressed 
markets. Log (NumPartnerships) is the natural log of the aggregated 
number of business partnerships between the lead arranger banks 
and financial institutions that take part in syndicated loans, which 
are arranged by the lead arranger bank’s parent BHC during the 
last five years before the previous year (same quarter-end). Stress 
is a time dummy variable that identifies the month of the mar- 
ket stress. The periods of market stress are defined as the months 
within the sample period that have monthly average spreads of the 
CP’s market yields against Treasury bill rates in the top 20%, fol- 
lowing the approach used in Acharya and Mora (2015) . As a robust- 
ness test, we replace the Stress dummy variable with a continuous 
variable, Spread , which is the monthly average spread between the 
yields on CPs and Treasury bills. As an extension, we assess how 
the regression results change if we drop the financial crisis period 
(from August 2007 to May 2009) from our sample. 
Fig. 2. Yield spread of three-month CPs against Treasury bills. 
This figure presents the trend of the yield spread (percentage points) of three- 
month CP rates against Treasury bill rates from 1999 to 2013. It also presents the 
months of market stress, defined as the months that have a monthly average spread 
between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills in the top 20%. Months of market 
stress include the periods of “Crisis0709,” which represents the period of the finan- 
cial crisis (August 2007 to May 2009). 
Fig. 2 provides a plot of the periods of Stress and the val- 
ues of Spread. X is a set of BHC- and bank-level control variables, 
which control for each BHC’s or each bank’s specific characteris- 
tics that may be highly related to the bank’s functioning in peri- 
ods of market stress as well as to its interbank partnerships. The 
BHC-level control variables are Log (BHCAsset) , Log (NumSyndicates) , 
and Log (AmtSyndicates) for the bank’s parent BHC. Bank-level con- 
trols are Log (BankAsset), Loan/Asset, Deposit/Liab, LeverageRatio, Cap- 
italRatio, NPLRatio, MarketShare, C&I/Loan , and Z-score of the lo- 
cal bank. Those control variables are measured at the previous 
quarter-end. For Log (NumSyndicates) and Log (AmtSyndicates) , the 
values are at the end of the same quarter of the previous year. 
The interactions between the above control variables and Stress 
or Spread are also included in the regressions as additional con- 
trol variables. Appendix A provides a description of each variable. 
These control variables absorb the effect of banks’ characteristics, 
such as existing asset or liability structures, and activeness of their 
syndicated loan arrangements on their liquidity constraints and 
ensure that our main coefficient captures only the effect of the 
number of banks’ business partnerships on their liquidity problems 
in stressed markets. δm,c and δi,c indicate the month-county and 
bank-county fixed effects, respectively. These fixed effects enable 
us to completely absorb each region’s (or county’s) unique charac- 
teristics, such as local credit demand and economic state, as well 
as macroeconomic conditions (e.g., monetary policy effects), which 
may drive the regression results, and allow us to capture only the 
interbank variation among local banks within the same county at 
a given time. 3 Standard errors are clustered at the bank’s parent 
BHC level. 
3 As documented in Kashyap and Stein (20 0 0) and Merkl and Stolz (2009) , mon- 
etary policy affects a bank’s liquidity provision and lending activity. As a robust- 
ness check, we control for variables that measure monetary policy effects, such as 
the Boschen and Mills (1995) index, federal funds rate, and the Bernanke and Mi- 
hov (1998) index, similar to Kashyap and Stein, in untabulated results. The inclu- 
sion of these variables, however, does not affect our estimation results because the 
time-by-county fixed effect absorbs these macro-level time-series variables. As an 
alternative robustness, we control for the variables that measure monetary policy 
effects while excluding the time-by-county fixed effect. The results are robust to 
controlling for monetary policy effects. Those test results are reported in Table C.2 
of the online appendix. 
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We next employ other sets of outcome variables that iden- 
tify the spillover effects of a bank’s liquidity constraints or the 
channel responsible for the bank’s liquidity problems: LiquidityCre- 
ation , Log (SmallBusinessLending) , Log (Mortgage) , and LCR . For the 
regressions with LiquidityCreation and LCR , we convert all of the 
monthly variables into quarterly variables. For the regressions with 
Log (SmallBusinessLending) and Log (Mortgage) , we measure all the 
variables in the annual average basis. All other specifications are 
the same as in Eq. (1) . 
4. Data and summary statistics 
4.1. Data source 
For these empirical tests, we rely on several sets of data 
sources. First, we use the Dealscan database provided by Thom- 
son Reuters LPC to identify each lead arranger bank’s syndicated 
loan business partnerships with participating financial institutions. 
The Dealscan database contains information on syndicated loan 
packages, including lenders’ and borrowers’ identities. Following 
Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2018) , we select the lead 
arranger of each syndicated loan package and manually match the 
lead arrangers’ names to the identifiers of the BHC in the Summary 
of Deposits, using the lead arrangers’ names. From this matched 
dataset, we can count the number of relationships between the 
lead arranger and participating financial institutions for each syn- 
dicated loan package at the bank level as well as the aggregate 
number of relationships at the BHC level. We aggregate those num- 
bers for the last five years up to the previous year based on the 
origination date of each package. Moreover, using Dealscan, we can 
identify the number of syndicated loan deals (package level) lead- 
arranged by a bank for the same period and the total aggregated 
dollar amounts of those deals, which are included as control vari- 
ables in the regression analyses. 
We collect and merge U.S. bank-level data from RateWatch, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora- 
tion. RateWatch provides the interest rates of various deposit prod- 
ucts, including money market accounts and CDs. After converting 
the weekly deposit rates into monthly averages at the branch level, 
we calculate each bank’s monthly average deposit rates. To iden- 
tify adverse market-wide shocks, we measure the spread of three- 
month CP yields against Treasury bill rates. Both rates are avail- 
able from Federal Reserve Economic Data. The Call Reports from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago contain banks’ balance sheets, 
income statements, and off-balance-sheet activities. Based on the 
accounting information from these Call Reports, we calculate each 
bank’s liquidity creation and estimate its LCR at each quarter-end. 
Bank-level control variables, such as total asset size, capital struc- 
ture, and loan quality, also are collected from this data source. 
Through the FR Y-9C from the Federal Reserve, we can iden- 
tify BHC-level control variables, such as consolidated asset sizes. 
Our study also measures the small business lending and mort- 
gage origination of each bank from the Federal Financial Institu- 
tions Examination Council. Moreover, the data provide information 
on the types of lending (e.g., retained by the originators vs. secu- 
ritized) of each mortgage loan. From this information, we can an- 
alyze how banks’ mortgage origination is affected by the number 
of their business partnerships in a stressed market for each type 
of lending (jumbo vs. non-jumbo mortgages and retained vs. secu- 
ritized mortgages). These mortgage subcategories are explained in 
Section 5 . Finally, we rely on the Summary of Deposits provided by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to understand the geo- 
graphic locations of bank branches. We identify local banks’ main 
business areas using the information on the geographical spreads 
of bank branches. 
4.2. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the key dependent 
and independent variables used in the empirical tests that relate 
banks’ liquidity constraint (in terms of deposit interest rates, liq- 
uidity creation, and lending activities) to the number of their ag- 
gregated business partnerships with syndicated loan participants 
in stressed markets. 
In Panel A, the first three rows provide banks’ monthly aver- 
age deposit interest rates. The average of banks’ deposit interest 
rates is 2.298% for the full sample period (1999–2013). The mean 
values of banks’ deposit interest rates fluctuate, depending on the 
periods. The mean value of deposit rates in the non-stress periods 
is 2.043%, whereas the value under market stress is 3.610%. If we 
convert the deposit interest rates into their spreads against risk- 
free rates, such as three-month Treasury bill rates, the difference 
in the spreads between non-stress and stress times also is signifi- 
cant. The mean value of deposit rate spreads against risk-free rates 
is 31 basis points for the full sample, but this value jumps to 66 
basis points during times of market stress. The average value of 
deposit interest rate spreads decreases to 25 basis points in non- 
stress times. 
The next line of the same panel contains the summary 
statistics of all other outcome variables that include Liquidity- 
Creation , Log (SmallBusinessLending) , Log (Mortgage) , and LCR . Next, 
Log (NumPartnerships) is the main independent variable of our tests, 
capturing the number of each bank’s aggregated business partner- 
ships with financial institutions established through its syndicated 
loan arrangements. Log (NumPartnerships) is the natural log of the 
aggregated number of business partnerships between the lead ar- 
ranger bank and participating financial institutions at the bank’s 
parent BHC level for the last five years until the previous year. 
The BHC-level variables include Log (BHCAsset) , Log (NumSyndicates) , 
and Log (AmtSyndicates) . Bank-specific characteristics are controlled 
for by the variables of Log (BankAsset), Loan/Asset, Deposit/Liab, 
LeverageRatio, CapitalRatio, NPLRatio, MarketShare, C&I/Loan , and 
Z-score . As noted, Appendix A provides a description of the 
variables. 
Panel B presents the results of the univariate tests for the mean 
values of the variables between banks with syndicated loan busi- 
ness partnerships and banks without such business partnerships. 
The univariate test results are consistent even when the cutoff for 
the number of business partnerships increases from zero to above 
ten. According to the univariate test results, banks with business 
partnerships tend to maintain lower deposit rates, create more liq- 
uidity, and originate more lending in normal times than do banks 
with no such business partnerships. The univariate test results, 
however, change dramatically in periods of market stress. We can 
no longer find significant differences in deposit interest rates and 
loan origination between the two types of banks in stressed mar- 
kets. Regarding the tests for control variables, the banks with busi- 
ness partnerships tend to be larger in their consolidated BHC as- 
sets or total assets than are banks without such business partner- 
ships. Banks with syndicated loan business partnerships are more 
likely to have a lower proportion of their total loans among to- 
tal assets, a lower proportion of total deposits among total liabil- 
ities, higher capital ratios, and lower non-performing loan ratios. 
As noted, we limit samples to local banks. The local banks are as- 
signed to one single U.S. county where the banks collect more than 
65% of their deposits. 
One caveat in interpreting the univariate test results is that 
both the outcome variable and the partnership measure may be 
highly correlated with regional economic conditions that surround 
the banks as well as with the banks’ characteristics. The univari- 
ate test results did not control for the effects of local economic 
situations and bank-specific characteristics on those variables. For 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics and univariate test results. 
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the key regression variables. The sample period runs from 1999 to 2013. Panel B provides the results of the univari- 
ate test of the mean values of the variables between banks with at least one relationship with other financial institutions through syndicated loan arrangements 
and banks without such a relationship in regard to significant differences. Appendix A provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
Panel A 
Percentile Distribution 
Variable n Mean SD 25th Median 75th 
DepositRate (total) 23,573 2.298 1.585 1.000 1.972 3.437 
DepositRate (Stress = 0) 19,739 2.043 1.510 0.800 1.612 3.000 
DepositRate (Stress = 1) 3834 3.610 1.290 2.500 3.520 4.600 
LiquidityCreation (total) 9077 0.413 0.193 0.310 0.419 0.517 
LiquidityCreation (Stress = 0) 7403 0.409 0.186 0.306 0.413 0.512 
LiquidityCreation (Stress = 1) 1674 0.432 0.220 0.332 0.443 0.535 
Log(SmallBusinessLending) (total) 991 10.874 1.181 10.208 10.900 11.533 
Log(SmallBusinessLending) (Stress = 0) 820 10.858 1.196 10.198 10.878 11.536 
Log(SmallBusinessLending) (Stress = 1) 171 10.948 1.109 10.332 10.954 11.491 
Log(Mortgage) (total) 1744 10.244 1.620 9.223 10.255 11.287 
Log(Mortgage) (Stress = 0) 1440 10.251 1.662 9.184 10.250 11.357 
Log(Mortgage) (Stress = 1) 304 10.214 1.402 9.429 10.339 11.095 
LCR (total) 4806 2.261 2.805 0.554 1.072 2.578 
LCR (Stress = 0) 3874 2.465 2.967 0.600 1.193 2.898 
LCR (Stress = 1) 932 1.415 1.762 0.432 0.757 1.547 
Log(NumPartnership) 23,573 0.130 0.655 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log(BHCAsset) 23,573 13.861 1.319 12.878 13.565 14.656 
Log(NumSyndicates) 23,573 0.136 0.602 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log(AmySyndicates) 23,573 1.318 5.075 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log(BankAsset) 23,573 13.244 1.101 12.463 13.178 13.814 
Loan/Asset 23,573 0.683 0.130 0.607 0.699 0.771 
Deposit/Liab 23,573 0.901 0.093 0.864 0.928 0.967 
LeverageRatio 23,573 0.090 0.027 0.076 0.085 0.097 
CapitalRatio 23,573 0.137 0.043 0.111 0.125 0.149 
NPLRatio 23,573 0.021 0.033 0.003 0.008 0.022 
MarketShare 23,573 0.030 0.046 0.004 0.014 0.039 
C&I/Loan 23,573 0.175 0.120 0.086 0.156 0.240 
Z-score 23,573 31.311 24.098 12.314 26.922 44.330 
Panel B 
With Partnerships No Partnerships Mean Difference 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median ( t -statistic) 
DepositRate (total) 2.185 1.687 2.303 1.990 −0.118 ∗ ( −2.37) 
DepositRate (Stress = 0) 1.865 1.193 2.051 1.635 −0.186 ∗∗∗ ( −3.54) 
DepositRate (Stress = 1) 3.528 3.250 3.615 3.540 −0.087 ( −0.94) 
LiquidityCreation (total) 0.571 0.511 0.408 0.416 0.163 ∗∗∗ (14.89) 
LiquidityCreation (Stress = 0) 0.552 0.508 0.404 0.410 0.148 ∗∗∗ (12.23) 
LiquidityCreation (Stress = 1) 0.635 0.554 0.423 0.440 0.212 ∗∗∗ (8.15) 
Log(SmallBusinessLending) (total) 11.857 12.271 10.789 10.838 1.068 ∗∗∗ (7.95) 
Log(SmallBusinessLending) (Stress = 0) 12.007 12.357 10.763 10.818 1.244 ∗∗∗ (8.25) 
Log(SmallBusinessLending) (Stress = 1) 11.269 11.206 10.915 10.940 0.354 (1.22) 
Log(Mortgage) (total) 11.481 11.633 10.184 10.206 1.297 ∗∗∗ (7.14) 
Log(Mortgage) (Stress = 0) 11.706 11.970 10.181 10.183 1.525 ∗∗∗ (7.42) 
Log(Mortgage) (Stress = 1) 10.491 10.706 10.199 10.320 0.291 (0.78) 
LCR (total) 3.171 1.463 2.212 1.062 0.958 ∗∗∗ (5.23) 
LCR (Stress = 0) 3.468 1.735 2.415 1.181 1.054 ∗∗∗ (4.73) 
LCR (Stress = 1) 2.267 1.042 1.355 0.744 0.912 ∗∗∗ (3.94) 
Log(BHCAsset) 16.513 16.944 13.736 13.502 2.777 ∗∗∗ (74.53) 
Log(BankAsset) 14.848 15.198 13.168 13.151 1.680 ∗∗∗ (51.28) 
Loan/Asset 0.637 0.661 0.685 0.701 −0.049 ∗∗∗ ( −11.93) 
Deposit/Liab 0.839 0.875 0.904 0.929 −0.065 ∗∗∗ ( −22.39) 
LeverageRatio 0.094 0.082 0.090 0.085 0.004 ∗∗∗ (4.96) 
CapitalRatio 0.150 0.126 0.136 0.125 0.014 ∗∗∗ (10.32) 
NPLRatio 0.017 0.008 0.021 0.008 −0.004 ∗∗∗ ( −3.86) 
MarketShare 0.070 0.039 0.028 0.014 0.041 ∗∗∗ (29.36) 
C&I/Loan 0.296 0.280 0.169 0.153 0.127 ∗∗∗ (34.66) 
Z-score 25.431 17.200 31.589 27.418 −6.158 ∗∗∗ ( −8.15) 
this reason, our regressions include the time-by-county fixed ef- 
fects that enable us to completely absorb the regional economic 
situations that may drive the differences in the mean values of our 
key outcome variables between more-partnered and less-partnered 
banks. Further, we add the control variables at the BHC and bank 
levels listed in Table 1 to control for the potential fundamental dif- 
ferences between the banks with a large number of business part- 
nerships and those without such a large number of business part- 
nerships. 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the empirical results in regard to 
business partnership and funding costs, business partnership and 
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Table 2 
Bank partnership and funding cost during market stress. 
This table presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnerships with participating financial institu- 
tions and its deposit funding costs, given market-wide stress. DepositRate is the deposit interest rate for CDs with account sizes of 10,0 0 0 USD and a 12-month 
maturity. Log (NumPartnerships) is the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan par- 
ticipating financial institutions, formed by the BHC’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of the same quarter of the previous 
year. Stress is a time dummy variable that identifies a month of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the monthly average spread between 
the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. Spread is the monthly average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. Crisis0709 is a time dummy variable 
that identifies the financial crisis (August 2007 to May 2009). This regression includes the BHC-level and bank-level control variables listed in Table 1 at the 
previous quarter-end. For Log (NumSyndicates) and Log (AmtSyndicates) , the values are at the end of the same quarter of the previous year. The interactions 
between the above control variables and Stress (or Spread ) also are included in the regressions as additional control variables. For brevity, the coefficients of 
these control variables are not reported. Appendix A provides a description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level; t -statistics are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
DepositRate 
All Crisis0709 = 0 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −0.168 ∗∗∗ −0.191 ∗∗∗ −0.194 ∗∗∗ −0.223 ∗∗∗ −0.236 ∗∗∗ −0.265 ∗∗∗
( −2.98) ( −3.33) ( −3.29) ( −4.09) ( −4.20) ( −4.01) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × Stress 0.104 ∗∗ 0.170 ∗∗∗
(2.16) (2.80) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × Spread 0.077 0.329 ∗
(1.30) (1.69) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,573 23,573 23,573 20,947 20,947 20,947 
Adjusted R 2 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.966 0.966 0.966 
liquidity creation, business partnership and small business lend- 
ing, business partnership and mortgage origination, and business 
partnership and liquidity, all in the context of stressed markets. 
5.1. Business partnership and funding cost in stressed markets 
Table 2 presents the relationship between banks’ business part- 
nerships and funding costs during market stress, as drawn from 
the results of the regressions described in Eq. (1) . Each bank’s 
monthly average deposit interest rates are used as the outcome 
variable. In Column 2, we include a time dummy variable ( Stress ) 
in the regressions to identify market stress. The regression results 
show that the interaction term of Log (NumPartnerships) × Stress is 
positive and statistically significant (Column 2). The coefficient of 
0.104 in Column 2 means that, if the number of a bank’s business 
partnership increases by 1%, the bank’s deposit funding costs in- 
crease by around 0.104 basis points in a stressed market. If banks 
are affiliated with the BHCs that have relationships with more 
business partners through syndicated loan arrangements in the 
previous five years, those local banks are more likely to suffer from 
high deposit interest rates in months of market stress. In other 
words, if a bank has more relationships with syndicated loan busi- 
ness partners, it is more likely to face a more-severe funding prob- 
lem during a liquidity crisis. In Column 3, we replace Stress with 
a continuous variable, Spread , which represents the spread of the 
monthly average market yields on CPs against risk-free rates. In 
Columns 4–6, we exclude the samples of the periods that corre- 
spond to the financial crisis. Even after dropping these unusual cri- 
sis times, our main coefficients are positive and statistically signif- 
icant. 
The coefficients reported in this table also are economically sig- 
nificant. The estimated values of Log (NumPartnerships) × Stress are 
10 to 17 basis points, which are approximately 4–8% of the mean 
value of monthly average deposit interest rates during the sample 
period. A one-standard-deviation increase in Log (NumPartnerships) 
is associated with a 7-basis-point increase in banks’ deposit inter- 
est rates in times of market stress. 
As a robustness check, we run the same regressions but limit 
samples to the pre-crisis period. During the financial crisis, uncon- 
ventional monetary policies (Quantitative Easing and Troubled As- 
set Relief Program) as well as unprecedented financial regulatory 
reforms (Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III) were introduced. These reg- 
ulatory changes may make a significant structural difference to the 
liquidity condition in the banking system relative to that in the 
pre-crisis period. The financial crisis itself should also be a devas- 
tating shock on the market liquidity. For this reason, we conduct 
the sub-sample regression for the pre-crisis period. Our results are 
robust to the sub-sample regression. Those test results are reported 
in Table C.1 of the online appendix. 
5.2. Business partnership and liquidity creation in stressed markets 
In the previous subsection, we showed that banks with more 
business partnerships are more likely to experience higher funding 
costs during market stress. If a bank suffers from a liquidity shock 
or funding problem, this adversely influences its liquidity provision 
to the economy. 4 
In this subsection, we present the results related to our in- 
vestigation of how the number of banks’ business partnerships 
relates to their liquidity creation during market stress. Following 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) , we use the “cat fat” measure as 
our liquidity creation variable. This category-based liquidity cre- 
ation measure includes off-balance-sheet activities in a notion that 
the category-based loan classification is more reasonable than is 
the maturity-based loan classification. For example, the maturity- 
based classification considers some business loans to be liquid 
even though business loans are difficult to dispose of by their na- 
ture. In contrast, the category-based classification treats all busi- 
ness loans as illiquid. Further, liquidity creation via off-balance- 
sheet items is crucial, particularly in large BHCs ( Berger and Bouw- 
man, 2009 ). Because our sample banks are the subsidiaries of 
4 Acharya and Mora (2015) document that, although U.S. banks faced rapid 
withdrawal of credit lines during the financial crisis, their liquidity pro- 
vision severely deteriorated without strong support from the government. 
Cornett et al. (2011) show that banks that held more illiquid assets reduced their 
credit supply during the financial crisis. Kashyap and Stein (20 0 0) and Khwaja and 
Mian (2008) highlight how adverse liquidity shocks on banks reduced their loan 
origination. 
8 
S. Choi, Y.K. Gam, J. Park et al. Journal of Banking and Finance 120 (2020) 105958 
Table 3 
Bank partnership and liquidity creation during market stress. 
This table presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnerships with participating financial insti- 
tutions and its liquidity creation, given market-wide stress. LiquidityCreation is a bank’s liquidity creation. In Panel A, we use total bank liquidity creation as 
the dependent variable. In Panel B, we use bank off-balance-sheet liquidity creation as the dependent variable. Log (NumPartnerships) is the natural log of the 
aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan participating financial institutions, formed by the BHC’s syn- 
dicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of the same quarter of the previous year. StressQ is a time dummy variable that identifies a 
quarter of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the quarterly average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. SpreadQ is the 
quarterly average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. Crisis0709 is a time dummy variable that identifies the financial crisis (August 2007 to 
May 2009). This regression includes the BHC-level and bank-level control variables in Table 2 . For brevity, the coefficients of these control variables are not re- 
ported. Appendix A provides a description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level; t -statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
Panel A 
LiquidityCreation 
All Crisis0709 = 0 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −0.017 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003 0.003 0.022 
( −1.04) ( −0.23) ( −0.13) ( −0.16) (0.18) (0.99) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × StressQ −0.045 ∗∗ −0.045 ∗∗
( −2.59) ( −2.07) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × SpreadQ −0.042 ∗∗ −0.117 ∗∗
( −2.38) ( −2.07) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5960 5960 5960 5324 5324 5324 
Adjusted R 2 0.928 0.931 0.931 0.927 0.928 0.928 
Panel B 
OBS-side LC 
All Crisis0709 = 0 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −0.001 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.009 
( −0.22) (0.82) (0.87) (0.50) (0.89) (1.06) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × StressQ −0.027 ∗∗ −0.024 ∗∗
( −2.57) ( −2.25) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × SpreadQ −0.026 ∗∗ −0.022 
( −2.13) ( −1.19) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5960 5960 5960 5324 5324 5324 
Adjusted R 2 0.971 0.972 0.972 0.969 0.969 0.969 
BHCs, we consider off-balance-sheet activities by using the cat fat 
measure. The liquidity creation variables are normalized by banks’ 
total assets at each quarter-end. Thus, we redesign our regression 
formula on a quarterly basis, as follows: 
Liquidit yCreat io n i,q = β0 + β1 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,q 
+ β2 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,q × Stress Q q 
+ X i,q + δq,c + δi,c + εi,q (2) 
In this equation, the subscript q refers to the quarter. StressQ is 
a time dummy variable that identifies a market-stressed quarter, 
and δq,c is the quarter-county fixed effects. 
Table 3 provides the regression results. In Panel A, the interac- 
tion terms of Log (NumPartnerships) × StressQ are negative and sta- 
tistically significant in all of the columns, regardless of whether we 
drop the samples of the financial crisis. These results imply that, if 
local banks have more business partnerships with financial institu- 
tions through syndicated loan arrangements, they are more likely 
to reduce liquidity creation in market-stressed quarters. The esti- 
mated value of −0.045 in Column 2 implies that, if the number of 
a bank’s business partnerships increases by 1%, the bank’s liquid- 
ity creation decreases by 4.5 basis points in the stressed market. 
In Columns 3 and 6, we replace the time dummy variable, StressQ , 
with a continuous variable, SpreadQ , which measures the quarterly 
average spread of market CP yields against risk-free rates. The esti- 
mated values of Log (NumPartnerships) × SpreadQ are still negative 
and statistically significant in all of the columns. 
The regression results are economically significant. The mag- 
nitude of Log (NumPartnerships) × StressQ is −0.045. Its absolute 
value is around 11% of the mean value of banks’ quarterly liq- 
uidity creation during the sample period. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in Log (NumPartnerships) is associated with a 7% decrease 
in banks’ liquidity creation relative to their total assets compared 
with its mean in a stressed market. 
The results in Panel B concern bank off-balance-sheet liquid- 
ity creation. We find that off-balance-sheet activities mainly drive 
the negative relationship between a bank’s number of partner- 
ships and the bank’s liquidity creation during periods of market 
stress. The results in Panel B shows that banks with more part- 
nerships are more likely to reduce their liquidity creation through 
off-balance-sheet activities. In contrast, in unreported results, we 
find that most of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant 
for asset- and liability-side liquidity creation. The different results 
between off-balance-sheet and on-balance-sheet activities suggest 
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Table 4 
Bank partnership and small business lending during market stress. 
This table presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnerships with participating financial insti- 
tutions and its small business lending, given market-wide stress. Log (SmallBusinessLending) is the natural log of a bank’s aggregated small business lending 
during a year. Log (NumPartnerships) is the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan 
participating financial institutions, formed by the BHC’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of June of the previous year. StressY 
is a time dummy variable that identifies a year of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the annual average spread between the yields on 
CPs and Treasury bills. SpreadY is the annual average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. Year08 is a time dummy variable that identifies 
2008. This regression includes the BHC-level and bank-level control variables in Table 2 . For brevity, the coefficients of these control variables are not reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level; t -statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , 
respectively. 
Log (SmallBusinessLending) 
All Year08 = 0 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) 0.025 0.101 0.108 0.004 0.060 0.168 
(0.29) (1.06) (0.97) (0.04) (0.49) (1.17) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × StressY −0.203 ∗∗ −0.364 ∗∗∗
( −1.98) ( −3.28) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × SpreadY −0.210 −0.548 
( −1.58) ( −1.52) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 991 991 991 928 928 928 
Adjusted R 2 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.843 0.843 0.844 
that those with more business partnerships adjust their liquidity 
creation via off-balance-sheet activities rather than by the liquidity 
creation via asset- and liability-side activities in stressed markets. 
The results are robust to the restricted samples that exclude the 
financial crisis period and the entire post-crisis period. 
5.3. Business partnership and small business lending in stressed 
markets 
As a next step, we test how a bank’s origination of small busi- 
ness lending is affected by the number of its syndicated loan part- 
nerships in stressed markets. In this test, we use the log of an- 
nual aggregated small business lending originated by each local 
bank Log (SmallBusinessLending ) as the outcome variable. We con- 
vert the monthly or quarterly value into an annual basis because 
each bank’s aggregated small business lending origination is avail- 
able at a yearly level: 
l og ( Smal l BusinessLending ) i,y 
= β0 + β1 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,y 
+ β2 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,y × Stress Y y 
+ X i,y + δy,c + δi,c + εi,y (3) 
In this equation, the subscript y refers to the year. StressY is 
a time dummy variable that identifies the years of market stress, 
and δy,c is the year-county fixed effects. Log (NumPartnerships) is 
the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships 
with financial institutions that participate in syndicated loan deals 
arranged by banks’ parent BHCs during the five years before the 
end of the previous June. 
Table 4 presents the regression results. The estimated value of 
the interaction term, Log (NumPartnerships) × StressY , is negative 
and statistically significant, as seen in Column 2. The coefficient 
of −0.203 in the second column means that, if the number of 
a bank’s business partnerships increases by 1%, the bank’s small 
business lending decreases by 0.203% in stressed markets. For this 
year-bank-level panel regression, the year 2008 is defined as the 
financial crisis period. 5 Even when we remove the financial crisis 
period from the sample, the interaction terms are significant both 
economically and statistically, as reported in Column 5. 
The regression results also are economically significant. A one- 
standard-deviation increase in Log (NumPartnerships) is related to a 
1.2% decrease in banks’ small business loan origination relative to 
its mean value in a stressed market. Overall, our regression results 
imply that banks with more business partnerships are more likely 
to reduce their origination of small business lending in stressed 
markets. In Columns 3 and 6, we replace the StressY dummy with 
SpreadY , which is the annual average spread of the yield on CPs 
against risk-free rates. Our regression results are robust under the 
specification with the continuous variable instead of the indicator 
variable. 
5.4. Business partnership and mortgage origination in stressed 
markets 
Now, we focus on the relationship between a bank’s num- 
ber of partners and the bank’s mortgage origination during a 
period of market stress. For this test, we employ the natural 
log of each bank’s aggregated mortgage origination in each year, 
Log (Mortgage) , as the dependent variable. As in the small business 
lending regressions, each bank’s aggregated mortgage origination is 
available at an annual frequency. Except for the outcome variable, 
we use the same regression specifications as in Eq. (3) . 
Table 5 provides the regression results for banks’ mort- 
gage origination in stressed markets. We find that the 
interaction terms of Log (NumPartnerships) × StressY and 
Log (NumPartnerships) × SpreadY are negative and significant 
in all of the columns. The coefficient of −0.562 in the second 
column suggests that, if the number of a bank’s business partner- 
ships increases by 1%, the bank’s mortgage lending decreases by 
0.562% in a stressed market. 
Regarding the results for banks’ mortgage origination, we find 
that mortgages are considered to be less susceptible to banks’ liq- 
uidity constraints due to their high likelihood of securitization. If 
5 The annual average spread of CP yields against risk-free rates in 2008 is almost 
twice that in 2007 and more than four times that of 2009. 
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Table 5 
Bank partnership and mortgage origination during market stress. 
This table presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnerships with participating financial insti- 
tutions and its mortgage origination, given market-wide stress. Log (Mortgage) is the natural log of a bank’s aggregated mortgage origination during a year. 
Log (NumPartnerships) is the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan participating 
financial institutions, formed by the BHC’’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of June of the previous year. StressY is a time 
dummy variable that identifies a year of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the annual average spread between the yields on CPs and 
Treasury bills. SpreadY is the annual average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. Year08 is a time dummy variable that identifies 2008. This 
regression includes the BHC-level and bank-level control variables in Table 2 . For brevity, the coefficients of these control variables are not reported. Standard 
errors are clustered at the BHC level; t -statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
Log(Mortgage) 
All Year08 = 0 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −0.421 ∗ −0.342 −0.278 −0.325 −0.283 −0.122 
( −1.68) ( −1.35) ( −1.03) ( −1.28) ( −1.15) ( −0.50) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × StressY −0.562 ∗∗ −0.550 ∗∗
( −2.24) ( −2.21) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × SpreadY −0.628 ∗∗ −1.173 ∗
( −2.33) ( −1.82) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1744 1744 1744 1626 1626 1626 
Adjusted R 2 0.794 0.797 0.796 0.797 0.801 0.800 
a bank can easily securitize its mortgages in the market, its mort- 
gage origination is not severely interrupted by its funding issues. 
Thus, we predict that, even if banks with more business partner- 
ships face more-severe liquidity shocks during market stress, they 
are less likely to face constraints in their mortgage origination, par- 
ticularly for those mortgages that are more likely to be securitized. 
To further test this hypothesis, we decompose mortgages into 
jumbo and non-jumbo loans. The Federal Housing Finance Agency 
has set a loan limit, below which government-sponsored enter- 
prises, such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fan- 
nie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac), are allowed to purchase mortgages from loan originators. 
Jumbo mortgages—mortgages above the loan limit—are more dif- 
ficult to securitize in the market because government-sponsored 
enterprises are not allowed to purchase them. For this reason, 
jumbo mortgages are more likely to be retained by the originating 
bank and are expected to be more sensitive to the originator’s liq- 
uidity shocks than are non-jumbo mortgages ( Loutskina and Stra- 
han, 2009 ). Thus, we compare the relationship between the num- 
ber of a bank’s business partnerships and the bank’s origination of 
jumbo mortgages with that of non-jumbo mortgages. 
The results, presented in Table 6 , show that the interaction 
terms, Log (NumPartnerships) × StressY and Log (NumPartnerships) ×
SpreadY , have negative and significant coefficients for jumbo 
mortgages, whereas the coefficients are insignificant for non- 
jumbo mortgages. The results for jumbo mortgages are also 
economically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
Log (NumPartnerships) is associated with a more than 3% decrease 
in banks’ jumbo mortgage origination in stressed markets. These 
regression results imply that banks with more business partner- 
ships are likely to reduce their mortgage loan origination only if 
lending is susceptible to their funding problems in stressed mar- 
kets. 
We further decompose mortgages into retained and sold mort- 
gages and compare the effects on banks’ mortgage origination in 
stressed markets for these two sub-categories. We expect that re- 
tained mortgages are more sensitive to the bank’s liquidity shocks 
than are securitized mortgages ( Gilje et al., 2016 ). The regres- 
sion results in Table 7 indeed confirm that the estimated val- 
ues of both interaction terms, Log (NumPartnerships) × StressY and 
Log (NumPartnerships) × SpreadY , are negative and significant only 
for retained mortgages. The coefficients are insignificant for sold 
mortgages. These results are consistent with those in Table 6 . In 
other words, banks with more business partnerships tend to re- 
duce their lending in stressed markets, particularly if these loans 
are expected to be retained in the banks, and, thus, they are 
more sensitive to liquidity shocks than are the potential securitized 
loans. 
In SubSections 5.2 through 5.4, we report that banks with ex- 
tensive business partnerships are more likely to reduce their liq- 
uidity creation and lending than are banks without such partner- 
ships. These test results are against the alternative hypothesis that 
more partnered banks are likely to face higher loan demands from 
borrowers in stressed markets, which may exacerbate the liquidity 
problems of those banks. Moreover, the adverse effect of partner- 
ships on lending activities is prominent if the lending activities are 
highly sensitive to the available funding. 
5.5. Business partnership and liquidity risk management 
In this subsection, we identify the channel through which 
banks with more partners suffer more liquidity problems 
than do less partnered banks, particularly in stressed markets. 
Castiglionesi et al. (2019) document that banks that have better 
accessibility to short-term interbank financing are incentivized to 
loosen their liquidity risk controls by holding lower reserves of safe 
liquid assets and expanding less-liquid and more-risky assets. This 
ultimately leads to a reduction of total liquid resources in the in- 
tegrated banking system under systemic shocks. Based on this the- 
oretical motivation, we investigate whether business partnerships 
among banks affect their incentive to manage liquidity risk. 
To examine the liquidity risk management of banks, we esti- 
mate their LCRs. An LCR refers to the stock of HQLAs held by a 
bank proportional to its expected net cash outflows over the next 
30 days. The measure indicates a bank’s short-term ability to with- 
stand a sudden withdrawal of funds. Because the definition and 
requirements of an LCR were initially introduced in 2010, LCR data 
are not publicly available in our sample period. Instead, we esti- 
mate the measure using the publicly available information in the 
Call Report similarly to Hong et al. (2014) . Appendix B presents the 
construction of an LCR from the variables in the Call Report. We 
then examine the relationship between a bank’s partnerships and 
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Table 6 
Bank partnership and mortgage origination during market stress (jumbo vs. non-jumbo). 
This table presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnerships with participating financial institu- 
tions and its mortgage origination, given market-wide stress. We compare the mortgage origination of jumbo and non-jumbo mortgages. Log (NumPartnerships) 
is the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan participating financial institutions, 
formed by the BHC’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of June of the previous year. StressY is a time dummy variable that 
identifies a year of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the annual average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. SpreadY 
is the annual average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. This regression includes the BHC-level and bank-level control variables in Table 2 . 
For brevity, the coefficients of these control variables are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level; t -statistics are in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
Log(Mortgage) 
Jumbo mortgages Non-Jumbo mortgages 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −0.066 0.044 0.265 −0.442 ∗ −0.428 −0.465 
( −0.37) (0.21) (1.32) ( −1.65) ( −1.45) ( −1.43) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × StressY −0.485 ∗∗ −0.320 
( −2.04) ( −1.20) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × SpreadY −0.961 ∗∗∗ −0.200 
( −3.20) ( −0.65) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1641 1641 1641 1732 1732 1732 
Adjusted R 2 0.711 0.714 0.716 0.809 0.811 0.811 
Table 7 
Bank partnership and mortgage origination during market stress (retained vs. sold). 
This table presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnerships with participating financial institu- 
tions and its mortgage origination, given market-wide stress. We compare the mortgage origination of retained and sold mortgages. Log (NumPartnerships) is 
the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan participating financial institutions, formed 
by the BHC’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of June of the previous year. StressY is a time dummy variable that identifies 
a year of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the annual average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. SpreadY is the annual 
average spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. This regression includes the BHC-level and bank-level control variables in Table 2 . For brevity, 
the coefficients of these control variables are not reported Appendix A provides a description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level; 
t -statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
Log(Mortgage) 
Retained mortgages Sold mortgages 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −0.179 −0.057 0.020 −0.574 −0.452 −0.398 
( −1.09) ( −0.35) (0.11) ( −1.15) ( −0.92) ( −0.69) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × StressY −0.657 ∗∗ −0.690 
( −2.32) ( −0.66) 
Log(NumPartnerships) × SpreadY −0.697 ∗∗ −0.549 
( −2.03) ( −0.46) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1738 1738 1738 936 936 936 
Adjusted R 2 0.772 0.775 0.774 0.754 0.755 0.754 
its LCR. Because we estimate a bank’s LCR using their quarterly fi- 
nancial statements, we construct a quarter-bank panel sample and 
design the regression equation as follows: 
LC R i,q = β0 + β1 log ( NumP ar tner ships ) i,q 
+ X i,q + δq,c + δi,c + εi,q (4) 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the regression results. In these re- 
gressions, the central coefficient of interest is Log (NumPartner- 
ships) . We use the full sample in Column 1, whereas we limit 
the sample to non-stress periods and stress periods in Columns 
2 and 3, respectively. A stress period identifies a quarter of mar- 
ket stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the quar- 
terly average spread between yields on CPs and Treasury bills. 
Log (NumPartnerships) has a negative and statistically significant co- 
efficient in the first column. Interestingly, the coefficient is signif- 
icant only in the non-stress period (Column 2); it is insignificant 
in periods of market stress (Column 3). These results are also eco- 
nomically significant. The coefficient of −1.027 in Column 1 means 
that, if the number of a bank’s business partnerships increases by 
an additional 1%, the bank reduces its LCR by 1.027% points. A one- 
standard-deviation increase in Log (NumPartnerships) is associated 
with a 30% decrease in a bank’s LCR relative to its mean value. 
A lower LCR means banks hold less or possibly insufficient HQLAs 
relative to their expected net cash outflows in the next 30 days un- 
der stressed market conditions. In other words, banks take more 
liquidity risk if they are partnered with more institutions. From 
these regression results, we conclude that banks with more part- 
nerships are more likely to loosen their liquidity risk management, 
which may lead to more-severe liquidity problems for those banks 
during a period of market stress. 
As the last stage, we investigate the relationship between a 
bank’s LCR and its deposit funding costs during a period of mar- 
ket stress to clarify the channel responsible for more-severe liq- 
uidity constraints on more partnered banks. In this test, we em- 
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Table 8 
Bank partnership and liquidity coverage ratio. 
Panel A presents the results for the relationship between the number of a bank’s syndicated loan business partnership with partici- 
pating financial institutions and its proforma liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which is its estimated Basel III LCR. Log (NumPartnerships) 
is the natural log of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan participating 
financial institutions, formed by the BHC’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years before the end of the same quarter of 
the previous year. Column 1 includes the full sample period. Columns 2 and 3 include the samples from the non-stress and stress 
periods, respectively. A stress period identifies a quarter of market stress that is within the top 20%, measured by the quarterly average 
spread between the yields on CPs and Treasury bills. Panel B presents the results for the relationship between a bank’s proforma LCR 
and its deposit funding costs, given market-wide stress. HighLCR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the annual average of a bank’s 
quarterly LCRs during past four quarters until the previous quarter-end belongs to top 25%, and 0 if the value belongs to bottom 25%. 
Except for replacing Log (NumPartnerships) with HighLCR , all other regression specifications are same as those used in Table 2 . In both 
panels, the regressions include the BHC-level and bank-level control variables in Table 2 . For brevity, the coefficients of these control 
variables are not reported Appendix A provides a description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level; t -statistics 
are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively. 
Panel A 
LCR 
Full sample period Non-stress period Stress period 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Log(NumPartnerships) −1.027 ∗∗ −1.424 ∗∗∗ −0.677 
( −2.55) ( −2.82) ( −0.91) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4806 4082 724 
Adjusted R 2 0.681 0.696 0.687 
Panel B 
DepositRate 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
HighLCR 0.042 0.095 0.117 
(0.55) (1.16) (1.42) 
HighLCR × Stress −0.258 ∗∗
( −2.23) 
HighLCR × Spread −0.222 ∗∗
( −2.38) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes 
Month-County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank-County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6842 6842 6842 
Adjusted R 2 0.949 0.950 0.950 
ploy the same regression setting used in Table 2 , except we re- 
place Log (NumPartnerships) with HighLCR as the main indepen- 
dent variable. HighLCR is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the annual average of a bank’s quarterly LCRs from the 
past four quarters to the previous quarter-end belongs to the top 
25%, and 0 if the value belongs to the bottom 25%. The regres- 
sion results are reported in Panel B of Table 8 . The interaction 
terms, HighLCR × StressY and HighLCR × SpreadY , have negative and 
statistically significant coefficients. The results highlight that banks 
with lower LCRs are more likely to face severe liquidity constraints 
in the stressed market in terms of deposit funding costs. By show- 
ing the negative relationships between the number of banks’ busi- 
ness partnerships and their estimated LCRs, we identify one chan- 
nel through which banks with extensive partnerships tend to face 
liquidity constraints in stressed markets; namely, these banks are 
more likely to loosen their liquidity risk management, as revealed 
by their estimated LCRs. 
The results provided in Table 8 have a vital policy implication. 
In a world of financial integration, the liquidity requirements from 
the Basel III Accord may help prevent liquidity crises. The increas- 
ing number of partnerships among banks leads to financial inte- 
gration, in which banks have incentives to co-insure their liquidity 
risks by relying on purchased liquidity rather than stored liquidity. 
As a result, banks become vulnerable to sudden liquidity shocks 
in which they are barely able to match their liquidity supply and 
demand. If, however, banks were required to hold sufficient liquid- 
ity proposed by liquidity requirements, such as an LCR, they might 
not have experienced a surge in funding costs that could result in 
those institutions’ serial defaults observed during the financial cri- 
sis. 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between banks’ business 
partnerships with syndicated loan participants and their vulner- 
ability to liquidity shocks in stressed markets. In our analyses, 
we use banks’ aggregated number of relationships with participat- 
ing financial institutions formed through syndicated loan arrange- 
ments as a proxy for the number of their business partnerships 
with financial institutions. We show that, as banks have extensive 
business partnerships with syndicated loan participants, they are 
more likely to suffer from increased funding costs, particularly in a 
stressed market. Moreover, these banks provide the economy with 
less liquidity, especially in terms of their off-balance-sheet activ- 
ities. We also find that banks with many partners are less likely 
to originate small business loans and jumbo/retained mortgages 
that are more sensitive to liquidity shocks. Further evidence high- 
lights that more-partnered banks tend to have lower LCRs than do 
less-partnered banks, suggesting that the loose liquidity risk man- 
agement of these banks drives the aforementioned adverse conse- 
quences in stressed markets. 
13 
S. Choi, Y.K. Gam, J. Park et al. Journal of Banking and Finance 120 (2020) 105958 
Our results are consistent with the expectations from the extant theoretical studies on financial integration and liquidity crisis (e.g., 
Castiglionesi et al., 2019 ). Financial integration improves social welfare by allowing the risk-taking of banks in the system. Nevertheless, 
the integrated financial market is vulnerable to an exogenous liquidity shock, as evidenced by the financial crisis. At the onset of a liquidity 
shock, banks may face a high funding cost, which can impede their ordinary business, including business loan and mortgage originations. 
Thus, storing liquidity may ultimately help banks prevent such cases even if these banks have the capability to purchase their liquid- 
ity from their partnered institutions. The finding of this paper provides one piece of evidence that justifies the strengthened liquidity 
requirements for banks, such as the LCR. 
Appendix A. Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Level 
DepositRate Deposit interest rates for CDs with account size of 10,000 USD and a 
12-month maturity (percent) 
Bank-Month 
LiquidityCreation Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred liquidity creation measure relative 
to total assets. This “cat fat” measure classifies loans by category 
regardless of their maturity, whereas all other activities are classified 
based on both their category and their maturity. This measure also 
includes off-balance-sheet activities 
Bank-Quarter 
Log(SmallBusinesslending) Logarithm of the aggregated amount (thousands USD) of small business 
lending origination by a bank in each year 
Bank-Year 
Log(Mortgage) Logarithm of the aggregated amount (thousands USD) of mortgage 
origination by a bank in each year 
Bank-Year 
LCR Ratio of a bank’s high-quality liquid assets over the bank’s expected net cash 
outflows. This ratio is estimated by using the bank’s financial statements 
Bank-Quarter 
Log(NumPartnerships) Logarithm of the aggregated number of business partnerships between a 
bank’s parent BHC and syndicated loan participating financial institutions, 
formed by the BHC’s syndicated loan arrangements during the five years 
before the end of the same quarter (or the end of June) of the previous 
year 
BHC-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Stress (StressQ, StressY) Dummy variable that identifies a month (quarter, year) of market stress that 
is within the top 20%, measured by the monthly (quarterly, annual) 
average spread between yields on CPs and Treasury bills 
Month/Quarter/Year 
Spread (SpreadQ, SpreadY) Monthly (quarterly, annual) average spread between the yield on CPs and 
Treasury bills 
Month/Quarter/Year 
Log(BHCAsset) Logarithm of the parent BHC’s consolidated assets (thousands USD) BHC-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Log(NumSyndicates) Logarithm of the aggregated number of syndicated loan deals arranged by 
the bank’s parent BHC during the five years before the end of the same 
quarter (or end of June) of the previous year 
BHC-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Log(AmtSyndicates) Logarithm of the aggregated amount (USD) of syndicated loan deals arranged 
by the bank’s parent BHC during the five years before the end of the same 
quarter (or end of June) of the previous year 
BHC-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Log(BankAsset) Logarithm of a bank’s total assets (thousands USD) Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Loan/Asset Ratio of a bank’s total loans over the bank’s total assets Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Deposit/Liab Ratio of a bank’s total deposits over the bank’s total liabilities Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
LeverageRatio Ratio of a bank’s Tier 1 capital over the bank’s total assets Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
CapitalRatio Ratio of a bank’s regulatory capital (the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) 
over the bank’s total risk-weighted assets 
Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
NPLRatio Ratio of a bank’s non-performing loans over the total loans Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
MarketShare A bank’s deposit market share in the county in which it collects at least 65% 
of its deposits 
Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
C&I/Loan Ratio of a bank’s commercial and industrial loans over the total assets Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Z-score A bank’s Z-score [ = (LeverageRatio + ROA)/S.D.(ROA)] Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
HighLCR Dummy variable that equals 1 if the annual average of a bank’s quarterly 
LCRs during past four quarters until the previous quarter-end belongs to 
the top 25%, and 0 if the value belongs to the bottom 25% 
Bank-Time (Quarter/Year) 
Appendix B. Liquidity coverage ratio 
An LCR refers to the stock of HQLAs held by a bank proportional to its expected net cash outflows over the next 30 days, where 
net cash outflows are cash outflows less cash inflows. This appendix provides a description of the construction of the LCR based on the 
publicly available information on banks’ financial statements. The corresponding items from the Call Reports are in parentheses. 
HQLAs are composed of two types of assets: Level 1 and Level 2. Level 1 assets include cash and balances due from depository in- 
stitutions ( RCON0010 ), held-to-maturity securities with 0% risk weights ( RCONB604 ), available-for-sale securities with 0% risk weights 
( RCONB609 ), and federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell with 0% risk weights ( RCONB613 in 2001 and 
RCONC063 from 2002 to 2014). Level 2 assets are subdivided into Level 2A and Level 2B assets. Level 2B assets, however, are not sepa- 
rately available in the public data. Level 2A assets include held-to-maturity securities with 20% risk weights ( RCONB605 ), available-for-sale 
securities with 20% risk weights ( RCONB610 ), and federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell with 20% risk 
weights ( RCONB614 in 2001 and RCONC064 from 2002 to 2014). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) states that qualifying 
corporate bonds with AA- or higher ratings are included in Level 2A assets, but they are omitted from our calculation because there was 
no categorization with ratings in our sample period. The stock of HQLAs is calculated as the sum of Level 1 and Level 2 assets. Level 
2 assets, however, cannot exceed 40% of the total HQLAs. In other words, Level 2 assets are limited to two-thirds of Level 1 assets. In 
addition, a reduction of 15% is applied to the value of Level 2 assets, while the value of Level 1 assets is accepted without modification. 
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The calculation of expected cash flows requires several assump- 
tions to be made, given the lack of data availability. First, the 
Call Reports in our sample period do not distinguish between re- 
tail deposits from individual customers and wholesale deposits 
from business or corporate customers. We consider deposits of less 
than 10 0,0 0 0 USD to be retail deposits and deposits of more than 
10 0,0 0 0 USD to be wholesale deposits. If the deposit size is un- 
available, we assume that the sizes of retail deposits and whole- 
sale deposits are 50% in each category. Second, the reports do not 
specify whether deposits are stable in the sense that they are cov- 
ered by deposit insurance or less stable. We obtain the uninsured 
ratio ( Uninsured ), which is the proportion of uninsured deposits 
( RCON5597 ) to the total deposits ( RCON2200 ). Then, we assume 
that the proportion of less-stable deposits in each type of deposit 
is the same for all categories. Third, the reports do not provide the 
exact amount of deposits that have a maturity of 30 days or less. 
We assume that maturity is evenly distributed. For example, de- 
posits of 30 days or less are approximated as one-third of deposits 
of three months or less. 
For demand deposits and term deposits with a maturity of less 
than 30 days, we rely on the total transaction deposits of individ- 
uals, partnerships, and corporations ( RCONB549 ) and one-third of 
the time deposits with a remaining maturity of three months or 
less ( RCONA579 for less than 10 0,0 0 0 USD and RCONA584 for more 
than 10 0,0 0 0 USD). Then, we multiply the corresponding run-off
ratio specified by the BCBS. For example, stable retail demand de- 
posits and term deposits with a maturity of less than 30 days 
have a run-off ratio of 3%. Thus, this is calculated as 0.03 × [(1- 
Uninsured ) × 0.5 × RCONB549 + (1- Uninsured ) × 1/3 × RCONA579 ]. 
Wholesale funds from non-financial corporations, sovereigns, cen- 
tral banks, multilateral development banks, and public sector enti- 
ties are calculated as the sum of the total transaction deposits of 
the U.S. government ( RCON2202 ), the total transaction deposits of 
states and political subdivisions in the United States ( RCON2203 ), 
and the total transaction deposits of foreign governments and offi- 
cial institutions ( RCON2216 ). Similarly, wholesale funds from other 
legal entity customers are estimated as the sum of the total trans- 
action deposits of commercial banks and other depository insti- 
tutions in the United States ( RCONB551 ), the total transaction de- 
posits of banks in foreign countries ( RCON2213 ), and one-twelfth 
of the other borrowings with a remaining maturity of one year or 
less ( RCONB571 ). 
Expected cash outflows include not only on-balance-sheet items 
but also off-balance-sheet items, particularly undrawn committed 
credit and liquidity facilities. To calculate expected cash outflows, 
we include the unused commitments secured by family residen- 
tial properties ( RCON3814 ); unused credit card lines ( RCON3815 ); 
unused commitment to commercial real estate, construction, and 
land development ( RCON3816 ); unused commitments to securities 
firms ( RCON3817 ); and other unused commitments ( RCON3818 ). In 
addition, we consider various letters of credit, including financial 
standby letters of credit ( RCON3819 ), performance standby letters 
of credit ( RCON3821 ), and commercial letters of credit ( RCON3411 ). 
All of these items are multiplied by the corresponding run-off rates 
proposed by the BCBS. 
Finally, cash inflows comprise maturing loans and securities. For 
example, expected cash inflows include one-third of the closed- 
end loans secured by family residential properties with a maturity 
of less than three months ( RCONA564 ) and one-third of the secu- 
rities issued by the U.S. government, states and political subdivi- 
sions, and mortgage pass-through securities not backed by family 
residential properties with a maturity of less than three months 
( RCONA549 ). We obtain each bank’s LCR from HQLAs divided by 
the difference between cash outflows and inflows. 
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